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Canadians outside Quebec are not easily inclined to think about how the prospect of 
Quebec’s independence might affect them. Indeed, their collective aversion to so 
profound a rupture to their political life has made the question almost an unthinkable 
one. Certainly, the relative paucity o f scholarly attention given to the matter is 
remarkable given the repeated and serious threat that the movement for Quebec’s 
independence has posed for several decades now. For the most part, the question has 
been regarded virtually as taboo, as though reflecting on the unthinkable might 
render the threat more tangible or even confer legitimacy upon it. Apart from a few 
lonely scholars who briefly reflected on the idea of a Canada without Quebec in 
conferences and publications, particularly during the dark days following the 
collapse of the Meech Lake Accord, there has been scarcely any enthusiasm for 
directing our intellectual resources to it.1 This neglect has extended as well to any 
serious consideration o f how Canadians should respond to a potentially affirmative 
vote in a referendum campaign run and controlled out of Quebec City. As a result, 
Canadians were totally unprepared for the referendum they nearly lost in 1995.
If  anything, the absence of serious analysis of the impact o f Quebec’s 
independence from a regional perspective is even more striking.2 Certainly, for 
Atlantic Canadians, this was a nightmare scenario better resisted and driven from 
mind than actively faced. O f course, everyone understood that Quebec’s 
independence would physically sever or separate Atlantic Canada from the rest o f
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the country and hence expose its unique vulnerability as a little-populated eastern 
maritime hinterland. Making matters worse was the region was by far the most 
economically dependent upon Ottawa for its survival. Hence, thinking the 
unthinkable here required more than the usual courage. Fear was compounded by 
embarrassment when Atlantic Canadians openly speculated about whether their 
region might even be wanted by other Canadians or, like former Premier John 
Buchanan of Nova Scotia, mused over whether the Americans might accept the 
isolated provinces.
In addition to geographic isolation and economic vulnerability, Atlantic 
Canadians also had to contend with the unknown contingencies and circumstances 
that might accompany Quebec’s independence. With no clarity on constitutional 
rules, there was always the prospect that Quebec’s independence might come as an 
illegal act by unilateral declaration following a simple majority vote on an unclear 
question in a referendum. Such an outcome would shake Canada’s political system 
and rule o f law, leaving little room for addressing outstanding issues of mutual 
concern in an orderly process of negotiation. This, together with the sheer 
unpredictability of events in these circumstances, made speculation about how the 
region might fare even more difficult.
However, some clarity has been brought to these issues more recently as a result 
o f steps undertaken by the Government o f Canada following the 1995 referendum. 
Canada’s reference case to the Supreme Court in 1998 respecting Quebec’s ability 
to effect secession unilaterally has led to a much greater understanding of the rules 
that must guide political actors in any future referendum on Quebec independence.3 
These guidelines, requiring that any referendum question on secession in Quebec be 
clear and that it secure a clear majority before negotiations could begin with 
Quebec’s federation partners, have helped reduce the uncertainties and 
miscalculations of the past. Indeed, in Bill C-20, these guarantees are now 
requirements of federal law.4 They prevent the Government o f Canada from 
entering into any negotiations with Quebec unless the House of Commons has 
previously declared that the question is clear and that a clear majority o f the 
population has expressed its will to Cease to be part o f Canada. If, however, such 
a majority of voters in Quebec do clearly express a will to secede from Canada, the
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Court has indicated that Canada has an obligation to negotiate in recognition o f the 
democratic legitimacy of that result. Such negotiations, in the language of the Court, 
“would need to address the interests o f the other provinces, the federal government 
and Quebec and indeed the rights o f all Canadians both within and outside Quebec, 
and specifically the rights o f minorities.”5
The carefully balanced and thoughtful nature o f the unanimous judgment has 
helped to reduce risk and brinkmanship among political actors and has increased the 
odds that if Quebec’s independence comes, it will be effected through negotiation. 
This can only reassure Atlantic Canadians that their concerns respecting borders, 
transportation linkages and minority linguistic rights will be addressed. Moreover, 
since the Atlantic provinces will be well-represented in any such negotiations and 
their consent required for the necessary constitutional amendments, there is less 
reason than in the past to fear the unpredictable. While risk and contingency can 
certainly not be ruled out, it is likely that other countries will now use the Court’s 
decision as a yardstick against which to measure Canadian political actors; indeed, 
as the court warned, if either Canada or Quebec failed to act in keeping with these 
standards, it would “put at risk the legitimacy of is exercise of its rights, and the 
ultimate acceptance of the result by the international community.”6
While all o f this is good news in reducing the nightmare scenario of illegal and 
unilateral actions, it says nothing about the prospects for Atlantic Canadians in the 
political aftermath. It is probable that if Quebec independence were being 
negotiated, a parallel process of re-negotiation would be required among the 
federation partners that would constitute the Rest o f Canada (ROC). The architecture 
of the federation would need to be revisited and the will o f its members to continue 
their political partnership tested. O f course, the legislatures and governments in 
ROC would seek to encourage continuity and stability, retaining wherever possible 
the whole corpus of Canadian law, institutions and practice. Canadians would 
doubtless seek to pull together, especially in the face o f so severe a dislocation to the 
body politic as the secession o f Quebec. But building a land of ROC as an enduring 
or acceptable substitute for the polity that had been lost would not be easy. This 
would be true for all Canadians, and certainly not least for Atlantic Canadians.
The root difficulty is that there is no vision of country for a Canada without 
Quebec. The land o f ROC would begin as an amputation from a larger geographic
5 Reference re Secession o f  Quebec, supra note 3.
6 Ibid.
and political partnership. While some scholars have given modest and often 
encouraging attention to the idea o f a Canada without Quebec, it is too easy simply 
to assume a will and ability to operate as one English-speaking nation from out of 
the regional remnants o f an older Canada. This is particularly true given the large 
and disproportionate (if not lopsided) differences in the population, political strength 
and economies of the regions. Reconciling these disparities within a new acceptable 
political framework of federation will not be easy. Moreover, in all probability, 
ROC would not even be territorially contiguous. Under these circumstances, Atlantic 
Canadians will want to consider seriously whether they would be as secure and well 
positioned within a reconstituted ROC as they are now within the status quo.
One of the most obvious concerns would be whether the departure o f Quebec 
would diminish the vital regional protections that Atlantic Canadians require in 
Canada. There is good reason to think this would be so. The perennial question o f 
sectional protection within a Canadian federation would certainly arise in a Canada 
without Quebec, and with more vengeance than had ever faced the original founding 
fathers. The problem would be Ontario. With nearly 50% of the population of the 
new country living within this region, its dominance would be ensured. Consider 
Parliament with virtually half the representation in a popularly elected House of 
Commons coming from one province, together with the legacy of an appointed 
Senate already ineffective in protecting less populated regions like Atlantic Canada. 
A certain consequence would be pressure for reconstituting provinces to recreate 
better population balance, and/or Senate reform as a matter of priority. The odds for 
success in either venture would not be high. And even if some success were 
achieved in negotiating and ratifying such changes, neither of these “solutions” 
would satisfactorily resolve the profound regional disparities that would exist.
These and other intractable problems that would confront Atlantic Canadians in 
a Canada without Quebec would doubtless emerge in conferences to redesign 
Canada’s constitutional architecture. In any rethinking of provincial boundaries, 
Maritime union too would no doubt raise its head once again as one o f several 
constitutional options for the region, and would be recommended by many 
Canadians outside who have always doubted the need and viability of four provinces 
in Atlantic Canada. This rationalist logic would, o f course, fly in the face o f the 
distinctive nature and interests o f Atlantic Canadians but it would take on more 
salience in troubled times.7
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Secondly, Atlantic Canadians would recognize more readily than any other 
region in the land o f ROC how fundamental a change to the character o f Canada had 
taken place. Instead of a linguistic partnership between French and English- 
speaking peoples, Canada would have become an overwhelmingly anglophone 
country in which Acadians, in particular, would feel considerably diminished. Even 
if legal guarantees for the linguistic minorities were to be negotiated prior to 
secession, and entrenched in the constitutions o f the new states, the spirit and 
political will behind bilingualism and linguistic partnership will surely have been 
shaken. This outcome can only be described as deeply traumatic for francophone 
inhabitants o f Atlantic Canada, who after all have lived as distinct communities for 
hundreds of years stretching back before the creation o f Canada itself. Acadians 
throughout the Maritime provinces will certainly feel less secure when the relative 
political weight o f Quebec has been truly subtracted from Canada. Indeed, it may 
be that this transformation in Canada's body politic would most adversely affect New 
Brunswick’s official bilingual regime, since it would no longer draw strength from 
Ottawa’s old national bilingual legacy. It is easy to imagine how linguistic tensions 
following the separation of Quebec from Canada could potentially de-stabilize the 
province’s delicate linguistic constitutional and political balance of power.
But Atlantic Canadians as a whole will also feel the absence of the political 
presence of Quebec in another important dimension, namely in the delicate sectional 
balance of “haves” and “have-nots.” Certainly residents of wealthier parts o f Canada 
that are taxed to provide transfer payments for less wealthy regions know that this 
part o f the national social contract is supported and sustained by the political 
presence of Quebec as the most powerful and populated have-not province. 
Moreover, to the extent that such transfers, including equalization payments, flow 
from Ottawa without conditions to the provinces or in the case o f health and post­
secondary education with very few constraints, also is chiefly due to Quebec’s 
interests and priorities.8 Not many Atlantic Canadians recognize sufficiently how 
vitally Quebec has protected their generous social safety net as a have-not region. 
Even fewer Atlantic Canadians have contemplated how exposed their interests might 
be in a federation overwhelmingly dominated by residents from “have” provinces 
in Ontario, Alberta, and British Columbia.
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The same message applies to the future of regional economic development 
programs in have-not areas, to concerns for regional protection and equity in all 
kinds of federal law and policy, particularly in the transportation sector. While on 
some of these issues Atlantic Canadians can again join forces with Westerners who 
have long complained about central Canadian dominance in federal policy, the issues 
may be more difficult to resolve in a Canada without Quebec. Challenging these 
will certainly be an uphill climb for a region that is already demoralized over the 
failure of national economic policies to include them, and who have nursed a feeling 
that their golden age was undone by central Canadians who hijacked the Maritime 
Conference with their agenda in 1864.
Finally, the possible departure of Quebec from the Canadian federation would 
certainly remove one of the principal justifications for the existence of a Canada 
quite distinct from that o f the United States. Certainly the reduction if not removal 
of the francophone component from Canada’s bicommunal nation would remove a 
principal sense of English-Canadian sense o f distinctiveness from the United States. 
With so many other symbols o f former English Canadian distinctiveness from 
Americans diminishing, and with the relentless integration flowing from free trade 
with the U.S., there will also be a disquieting fear that, after all, what is ROC and 
what distinctive sense o f country guarantees its resistance to the lure of America? 
This magnetic draw from the south, always present in our history and much 
enhanced with free trade, now poses a greater risk to the long term independence of 
Canadian communities than ever before.
To fight this threat some advocates of a Canada without Quebec have argued for 
a more centralized federation with a stronger uncompromising federal role. They 
reason that with Quebec gone and provincialism challenged elsewhere in English 
speaking Canada, the pendulum could swing decisively in Ottawa’s favour.9 Yet, 
if the Canadian federation were to undergo this kind o f centralizing trend, so typical 
in many other federations around the world, then it is debatable how far the interests 
o f Atlantic Canadians would be served. Certainly, on the one hand, there would be 
stronger national standards and funding for a variety of public activities that would 
benefit Atlantic Canadians, but there would equally be even more loss of local 
control in the bargain. In an age of globalization that paradoxically appears to
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demand stronger localism, this potential drift toward a more centralized federation 
might take the region in an unwise direction.
This at least seems to be the lesson of much of the contemporary world in 
Europe and elsewhere: the simultaneous expansion o f global economic space 
together with an enhanced localism. If  Atlantic Canadians were to draw their 
political direction from these contemporary lessons, then a better option might be to 
seek their own looser patterns o f sovereignty/association. Once a heretical notion, 
Rene Levesque’s old formula seems increasingly de rigeur. The political imperative 
of subsidiarity, or respect for local control wherever feasible, seems tailor-made for 
life within larger economic and political formations. Following this script, Atlantic 
Canadians would protect their economic space within a reconstituted Quebec/Canada 
in a vast continental economic union of the Americas, while simultaneously shoring 
up wherever possible their local capacity to shape their own societies within looser 
bonds o f Canadian fraternity. This seems a possible sensible direction that Atlantic 
Canadians might pursue as a preferable outcome to membership in a more 
centralized federation dominated by Ontario, or worse yet, union with the United 
States. This struggle to better position their region as an active political player in 
international economic space is, after all, a task that Atlantic Canadians must face 
in any event, whatever should come of Quebec’s dreams of independence.
